13.07.11 Menas Borders
A new 'flashpoint'? The Israel-Lebanon maritime border dispute
Overview
At first glance, a new flashpoint in the Middle East appears to be emerging in
the form of the disputed maritime border between Israel and Lebanon. The states
have not successfully formalised their maritime borders, and this has become
problematic with the discovery of natural gas reserves in the Levantine Basin.
The
discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan fields has prompted speculation that
other,
similar discoveries stand to be made along the coastline of the eastern
Mediterranean. This suggests the increasing criticality of precisely delimited
maritime
boundaries between the states' Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), within which
they exclusive rights over natural resource exploitation.
Four hundred and thirty square miles are contested in the present dispute which
is made further
problematic by the diplomatic relations between the state parties: Lebanon, for
example, does not recognise Israel and has left the matter open for resolution
by
the UN. The UN has said that it cannot take any such action on the basis that
the
delineation of the maritime boundary between the states is no part of the UN
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mandate.
For its part, Israel includes the
maritime boundary as but one aspect of the generalised political crisis that it
says
characterises the entire maritime and land border that separates it from
Lebanon.
The other major player, the US, has appeared to support the Lebanese position
for instrumental reasons, and its representative has sought to depoliticise the
current crisis, and frame it in technical and legal terms.
It would seem that the US is on its own, at least in this respect. Media
reports have speculated on the potential for a repeat of the war fought between
Israel and Lebanon five years ago, with the maritime border as the new,
critical
factor. But while the dispute may be overtly political it seems that risks of a
new
confrontation are being exaggerated. Moreover, it may also be that the position
adopted by the US with respect to its ally, Israel, is not as unusual as it may
first appear; rather, it is the continuation of policy through more nuanced
means.
The nature of the dispute
In August 2010 the Lebanese government submitted a map to the UN which, through
the use of a border line, defined the extent of its EEZ. This line is to the
south of the equivalent line proposed by Israel on 10 July 2011, but its
position
has been endorsed by the US government. Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has
argued that the Lebanese line contradicts both the lines that both Lebanon and
Israel have agreed with Cyprus in, respectively, 2007 and 2010, on the western
extents of their EEZs.
In international law, the principle of acquiescence suggests that a right to a
claim may be lost if a party remains silent when a unilateral move, i.e. the
claim to territory articulated by the Lebanese submission of a map, is made. It
was
for this reason that the Israeli cabinet approved its own border delimitation
on
Sunday 10th July
.
Lebanon's response has been to signal its commitment to
protecting the 2010 borders. The hydrocarbon reserves enclosed by the limits of
these overlapping claims are those at the centre of the present dispute. Energy
analysts have discussed how Israeli control of them would make Israel a
gas-exporting state whereas, at present, its supply is under threat of
disruption, the
pipeline from Egypt having been repeatedly bombed in recent months.
Elements within the Israeli government have argued that protestations to the
Israeli line are made by elements within Lebanon, principally Hezbollah, intent
on
provoking a conflict. This, to Israeli officials, may represent a maritime
Shebaa Farms—the area of territory that Hezbollah has long accused Israel of
occupying illegally, but claimed, by Israel, as a part of the Golan
Heights—and,
thereby, offer the pretext to a conflict. As in the case of the Shebaa Farms,
their
policy view is that the territory is legitimately held, and that the existence
of
the dispute and the competing claims presents little more than a rationale for
a
confrontation provoked by the hostile powers that surround Israel. Indeed, a
position used by Israeli politicians is that the present dispute is symptomatic
of
a relationship with Lebanon, in which elements within the country will seek to
thwart everything that Israel seeks to do.
The Lebanese government's position has been that Israel has violated
international law, and Lebanese sovereignty, in coming to the 2010 agreement
with Cyprus.
In January 2011 the Lebanese Foreign Minister wrote to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
to ask that the UN work to prevent Israeli exploitation of hydrocarbon
reserves
in within the EEZ determined in the maps submitted by his ministry in August
2010. The energy minister, Gebran Bassil, has said that the government plans to
auction off concessions in 2012; before then he has said that Lebanon will seek
to
counter Israel's continuing aggression and retaliate through political and
diplomatic means.
The position of the US, and of the senior US diplomat in charge of the
Israel-Lebanon brief, Frederic Hof, has been to ensure that the dispute cannot
become the
pretext for conflict that the Israeli government anticipates. Hof has sought to
ameliorate tension through the appearance of appeasement, if not appeasement
outright. The US, after all, has a number of private commercial interests
within
this context; companies are involved in exploratory and research activities in
the
Levantine Basin. Hof has appeared to back, at least in part, the Lebanese line,
and has suggested that Israel submit the dispute to the UN, and indirectly
negotiate with Lebanon through this channel, given the non-recognition problem.
(Israel has, of course, refused this option and called upon Lebanon to
negotiate all
of the current border issues, both on land and at sea.) Its commercial
interests
considered—and its future access to the reserves in question—it is in US
interests to adopt a policy that does not automatically privilege its
longstanding
regional ally in the Middle East. The US has recognised the danger of the
pretext in
the specific setting and played its hand accordingly; it will back the Lebanese
claim to avoid a Shebaa Farms situation at sea and protect the interests of
American firms and investors.
The way ahead
Perhaps this apparent marginalisation of Israel by the US makes more sense than
at first it might appear. Granted, the commercial interests are important, but
two other concerns should also be considered: Israel's energy security (and
recogtnition of the potential disruption of the gas supply to Israel, and the
increase in prices that this would dictate); and the actual scale of the
natural
resource reserves in the disputed area. A third factor, the likelihood of a new
conflict, five years on from the border war, is also debatable despite the line
peddled by news sources.
The disruption inflicted by recent attacks upon the gas pipeline between Egypt
and Israel have shown that attacks on Israeli gas facilities will not be borne
lightly. In this sense the US and Israel can work together: Israel can perform
a
display of jealously guarding its sovereignty, while its more powerful ally
can
adopt a pragmatic, conciliatory line, and support the Lebanese claim. This may
reduce the potential for gas supply disruption to Israel given that the
justification for Hezbollah sabotage could evaporate; the US conciliates so
that Israel
does not have to appear to stoop so low.
With respect to the scale of the deposits in the disputed area, it may be that
the problem is being inflated quite falsely. According to one source, the
border
route that follows the Lebanese course affects only the northern parts of the
Alon and Ruth licences which, although they may contain smaller oil and gas
deposits, are not the prime concerns of Noble Energy and Delek, the firms that
own the
licences. Their primary interests are situated further south. If this view is
correct then the major consequence of adopting the Lebanese maritime line would
only be to delay—and by no means permanently forestall—the development of the
less
consequential Alon and Ruth licences.
Hof has attempted to frame the dispute in technical and economic terms and to
ensure that it does not become a political matter. Perhaps this is in line with
an
overall US strategy, concerned with protecting Israel but, moreover, with
appeasing Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. Put simply, perhaps the stakes are not as
high,
and maybe Israel is not conceding as much, as the US and Israel might like it
to
appear at first sight. In any case, as Eyal Zisser of Tel Aviv University has
argued, a conflict between Israel and Lebanon is unlikely. Both sides have a
great
deal to lose. Rocket attacks on Israel, and the destruction of Lebanese
infrastructure would be the consequences, and the 2006 war is still a memory
fresh
enough to provide a measure of deterrence. Supporting the Lebanese
interpretation of
the maritime boundary therefore provides the US with a route to protect the
Israeli energy supply, articulate a show of its own strength (and independence
from
Israel), at cost (in resource terms) that is lower than it seems.
Sources: Al Arabiya, Bloomberg, The Financial Times, Haaretz, The Independent, Jerusalem
Post, Jewish Week, New Zealand Herald
Related news stories: